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1 Introduction
In developed countries whose economic conditions are not as diverse, each situation in the
welfare benefit program is different. In Japan and Germany, the level of welfare is high, but
the recipient ratio, which is the number of welfare recipients divided by the total population,
is low. In contrast, the United Kingdom and the United States have lower levels of welfare
but higher recipient ratios (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006).
The standard model can explain ‘welfare fraud’ but not ‘non-take-up of welfare’: welfare
fraud occurs when households take up welfare even though they are non-eligible; non-take-up
welfare signifies that needy people do not take up welfare even though they are approved to
take up it. However, ‘non-take-up’ occurs in most developed countries (Currie, 2006; Immer-
voll, 2009; Plueger, 2009). Moreover, the result of comparative statics in the standard model
cannot explain this relationship between the level of welfare and the recipient ratio since the
increase in the level of welfare always increases the incentive of taking-up welfare. Thus,
the standard model cannot illustrate two phenomena: non-take-up and the counterintuitive
relationship between the welfare level and the recipient ratio among developed countries such
as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.
The contributions of this study include the following: first, we construct a model in which
non-take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and show that a comparative statistic
analysis reveals the possibility that the recipient ratio decreases as the benefit level increases.
Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find that this association
is observed and that the benefit level and the recipient ratio exhibit an inverse U-shaped
relationship.
We construct a model that can explain non-take-up by introducing stigma. Stigma is
a sociological concept describing a negative label applied to behavior by society or a social
group (Goffman, 1963). In particular, stigma is an important concept in social psychology
(Major et al., 2018). The term welfare stigma refers to the socio-psychological effects and
psychological costs associated with taking-up welfare (Besley and Coate, 1992). The mecha-
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nisms of the occurrence of welfare stigma have primarily been discussed mainly in sociological
studies (Spicker, 1984). Welfare stigma is thought to arise from a negative social image of re-
cipients based on the perception that recipients are inferior to non-recipients. Consequently,
recipients are treated as socially undesirable compared to non-recipients, thus reducing the
utility of recipients. This study aims to explain the abovementioned two phenomena by
analyzing the interdependence between the welfare stigma level and decision-making of the
needy and non-needy type individuals. This study extends the model of Besley and Coate
(1992) to explain the occurrence of non-take-up of welfare benefits. Unlike Besley and Coate
(1992), we endogenize decision-making for needy poor people. The result in our comparative
static analysis indicates that an increase in the benefit level can decrease the ratio of welfare
recipients to population. To verify the result, this study conducts an empirical analysis using
panel data. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical analysis.
Our model considers two types of an individual: the needy type and the non-needy type.
The needy type chooses whether to take up welfare or not, while the non-needy type chooses
whether to work or take up welfare. If individuals take up welfare benefits, they suffer
from disutility due to social stigma. This stigma cost is endogenously determined, and the
higher the conditional probability that a recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the higher the
stigma cost. Sensitivities to stigma costs are distributed among needy and non-needy types,
respectively. Among the non-needy type, less sensitive individuals take up welfare and more
sensitive individuals choose to work. On the other hand, for the needy type, less sensitive
individuals choose to take up welfare, while more sensitive individuals do not take up it. In
the equilibrium, the decision of the non-needy type, the decision of the needy type and the
level of stigma cost are determined interdependently.
In our empirical analysis, we use panel data obtained by OECD.stat from 2007 to 2012 for
25 developed countries to examine the relationship between the level of social welfare receipts
and the recipient ratio as indicated by the model described above. Regression analysis using
five estimation methods that take into account unknown confounding factors shows that the
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relationship between the level of social welfare receipts and the recipient ratio shows a statis-
tically significant inverse U-shape. In addition, sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness
of this result. Thus, using these OECD panel data, we find that the results of the empirical
analysis are consistent with the model described earlier for the period from 2007 to 2012 for
these countries. The relationship between the benefit level and the recipient ratio in this
empirical analysis can be explained by the direct and indirect effects of an increase in the
benefit level in the theoretical analysis; the direct effect is an increase in the level of benefits,
which increases the incentive to take-up benefits. On the other hand, the indirect effect
occurs through stigma and can increase the disincentive to take up benefits. Therefore, the
positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect effect and the recipient ratio increases
when the benefit level is low, the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and the recipient
ratio decreases when the benefit level is high.
Several studies have conducted theoretical and/or empirical analysis of the welfare stigma1.
Moffitt (1983) conducted one of the earlier studies focusing on welfare stigma in economics by
analyzing household decision-making regarding whether to take up welfare benefits or supply
labor by including the stigma as a kind of monetary cost. Moreover, that paper empirically
examined theoretical results using panel study of income dynamics (PSID). Consequently,
that author suggested that fixed stigma is statistically significant, but that variable stigma
with respect to benefit level is not. Besley and Coate (1992)’s pioneering research analyzed
situations wherein stigmas were endogenized. They presented two models of social stigma:
statistical discrimination and taxpayer resentment. Their results indicated the occurrence
of welfare fraud. As needy types usually chose to take-up welfare benefits, non-take-up of
welfare benefits did not manifest in their model. Blumkin et al. (2015) analyzed welfare
stigma as a policy tool, which was used to restrain welfare fraud. However, the take-up rate
in the United Kingdom was approximately 80 % (Duclos, 1995), while it was approximately
1There are also researches in economics, which focus on stigma other than the welfare stigma. For exam-
ple, Rasmusen (1996) analyzes the stigma against criminals; Kim (2003) investigates the stigma associated
with tax evasion; Katafuchi et al. (Forthcoming) analyze the stigma on going-out behavior under a declared
state of emergency triggered by COVID-19.
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60—67 % in the United States (Blank and Ruggles, 1996), approximately 37 % in Germany
(Riphahn, 2001) and 16.3—19.7 % in Japan (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006). Thus, non-
take-up welfare did not manifest in their model2. One of the few exceptions is Itaya and
Kurita (2020). Itaya and Kurita (2020) analyzes both welfare fraud and non-take-up using
the replicator dynamics, while this paper analyzes a static model.
The structure of this paper is as follows; the next section presents the theoretical model
and comparative static analysis. The third section conducts empirical analysis regarding the
relationship between the benefit level and the recipient ratio. The final section concludes this
paper.
2 Theoretical model
This study develops a model to analyze the interaction between welfare stigma, welfare fraud,
and non-take-up. There are two types of an individual, the needy type and the non-needy
type. The needy type chooses whether to take up welfare or not, and the non-needy type
chooses whether to work or take up welfare. Each individual makes a decision corresponding
to the level of stigma cost by taking up welfare. This stigma cost is determined endogenously,
and the higher the conditional probability that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the
higher the stigma cost. The sensitivity to stigma costs is distributed among the needy and
non-needy types; among the non-needy type, those who are less sensitive take up welfare and
those who are more sensitive choose to work. Among the non-needy type, on the other hand,
those who are less sensitive choose to take up welfare, while those who are more sensitive
choose not to take up. In the equilibrium, the decision of the non-needy type, the decision
of the needy type and the level of stigma cost are determined interdependently.
In the comparative static analysis, we show the possibility that the recipient ratio de-
creases as the benefit level increases.
2Hupkau and Maniquet (2018) analyzed the problem of non-take-up of welfare from the perspective of
identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kranton, 2016)
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2.1 Basic setting
There are two types of individuals in the economy: the needy type and the non-needy type.
A ‘needy type’ is an individual who cannot work and a ‘non-needy type’ is defined as an
individual who can work if he or she is motivated to do so. We assume that a proportion of
needy types in the total population is γ ∈ (0, 1). In the economy, needy types are eligible for
welfare benefits, and non-needy types are not. That is, ‘non-take-up welfare’ occurs when
the needy type does not choose to take up welfare benefits and ‘welfare fraud’ is the situation
in which the non-needy type decides to take up welfare benefits. To make the notation clear,
we denote the needy type as ‘type 1’ and the non-needy as ‘type 2’.
Type 1 individuals have two choices; take-up welfare or not. The utility setting is as
follows,


u (b, z1)− φ1s (p, q, z1) if taking up welfare,
0 otherwise,
(2.1)
where s is an index of stigma cost, which is explained later, p is a proportion of recipients
to sub-population of type 1, q is a proportion of recipients to sub-population of type 2 and
φ is the sensitivity to stigma. u(·, ·) denotes a material utility, zi is type i’s capability
of consumption, i ∈ {1, 2}, and b is a level of welfare benefit. We assume the following
properties:
∂u(I,zi)
∂I
> 0,
∂u(I,zi)
∂zi
> 0,
∂2u(I,zi)
∂I∂zi
> 0,
(2.2)
where i ∈ {1, 2} and I ∈ {w, b}. The third property means that capability and consumption
are complementary. For simplicity, we assume that the price of consumption goods is 1.
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Type 2 individuals have two choices: either to take up welfare benefits or work. Type 2’s
utility setting is as follows:


u (b, z2)− φ2s (p, q, z2) if taking up welfare,
u (w, z2)− θ if working.
(2.3)
Here θ is disutility of labor, w is work income, and w is assumed to be lower than b. φi
is uniformly distributed from 0 to φ among type i’s sub-population, φi and φj are i.i.d,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, and i 6= j. We assume that z2 > z1 > 0: that is, type 2’s capability is
higher than that of type 1 individuals who cannot work because of time constraints, physical
disabilities or mental illness. These constraints can affect consumption. For example, it
makes sense that a single-parent household with limited free time will not enjoy consumption
from income I as much as a household with two parents.
2.2 Critical level of sensitivity to stigma
To understand a household’s decision-making, we consider the critical sensitivity of stigma
cost, φˆi, i ∈ {1, 2}, as follows:
u (b, z1)− φˆ1s (p, q, z1) = 0, (2.4)
u (b, z2)− φˆ2s (p, q; z2) = u (w, z2)− θ. (2.5)
Type 1 households, where φ1 is less than or equal to φˆ1, prefer to take up welfare. Then,
all households in which φ1 ∈
[
0, φˆ1
]
choose to take up welfare and all households in which
φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
do not. Similarly, type 2 households in which φ2 is less than or equal to φˆ2
prefer to take up welfare. All households in which φ2 ∈
[
0, φˆ2
]
choose to take-up welfare.
On the other hand, all households in which φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
choose to work.
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The proportion of recipients in type 1, p, is as follows:
p = min
{
φˆ1
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z1)
φs (p, q, z1)
, 1
}
, (2.6)
While the proportion of recipients in type 2, q, is as follows:
q = min
{
φˆ2
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ
φs (p, q, z2)
, 1
}
. (2.7)
We assume that u (b, z2)−u (w, z2)+ θ > 0 in order to focus on the economically meaningful
situation. In the next subsection, we consider the formulation of the stigma cost and the
equilibrium in the model.
2.3 Stigma cost function and equilibrium
In this subsection, we formulate the stigma cost function. The stigma cost is endogenously
determined, and the higher the conditional probability that a recipient is a non-needy type,
i.e., fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. The probability that a recipient is
non-needy is given by the following:
Pr(i = 2|Taking up welfare) =
(1− γ)q
γp+ (1− γ)q
:= Π. (2.8)
We assume that stigma cost is an increasing function with Π as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) ,
∂s (Π(p, q), zi)
∂Π
> 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(2.9)
This formulation is inspired by the statistical stigma in Besley and Coate (1992) and Blumkin
et al. (2015). Setting a stigma occurs as follows. People in society despise ‘welfare fraud’
(the taking-up of welfare by non-needy type individuals(type 2)). However, it is difficult to
identify whether welfare fraud is actually being committed without distinguishing between
7
types 1 and 2. This stems from the idea that, in the world, it is not reprehensible for a truly
needy individual to take up welfare, but a negative image is formed of an individual who is
not needy taking-up welfare, which causes stigma.
Stigma cost is a function of capability. While Besley and Coate (1992) assumed that
stigma cost was the same for all recipients, we differentiate stigma cost by the capabilities of
types 1 and 2. Thus, we assume that s(Π(p, q), z1) 6= s(Π(p, q), z1)∀z1, z2, z1 6= z2. We denote
pi as the ratio p/q, and then,
Π =
1
γp/[(1− γ)q] + 1
=
1
γ/(1− γ)pi + 1
. (2.10)
We can rewrite equation (2.9) as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) = s (Π(p/q, 1), zi) := s (Π(pi), zi) . (2.11)
Obviously, the stigma cost function decreases with respect to pi as follows:
∂s (Π(pi), zi)
∂pi
=
∂s (Π(pi), zi)
∂Π
∂Π
∂pi
< 0. (2.12)
For simplicity of notation, let s (pi, zi) denote s (Π(pi), zi). An equilibrium point corre-
sponds to a solution in the following simultaneous equation:


p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
(2.13)
Here, uˆ(b, zi) is the incremental material utility for type i ∈ {1, 2} when taking-up welfare.
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Specifically, uˆ(b, z1) and uˆ(b, z2) are defined as follows:
uˆ (b, z1) := u (b, z1) ,
uˆ (b, z2) := u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ.
(2.14)
By substituting the first and the second row equations into the right-hand side of the third
row equation of Equation (2.13), we get the following equation:
pi =
p
q
,
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
:= M(pi).
(2.15)
The equilibrium in this model is the fixed point of Equation (2.15). By differentiation, we
obtain the following:
dM(pi)
dpi
=
∂s (pi, z2)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z2)
−
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z1)
. (2.16)
Here, we define the elasticity of stigma cost to pi as follows:
εpi (zi) := −
∂s (pi, zi)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, zi)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.17)
By using this elasticity, we can rewrite Equation (2.16) as follows:
dM(pi)
dpi
= εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) . (2.18)
Equation (2.18) corresponds to a slope of M(pi). Then, if εpi (z1) − εpi (z2) in some domain,
the possibility of multiple equilibria exists. The stability condition is given as follows:
εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) < 1. (2.19)
We henceforth focus on the equilibrium where the stability condition is retained. The
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next subsection presents the comparative static analysis focusing on the effect of changes in
the benefit level on the recipient ratio in each type and the economy.
2.4 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we conduct comparative statics. We are particularly interested in how
a change in benefit level affects equilibrium, and we compare our empirical evidence and
theoretical results.
We define the elasticity as follows:
ηb (zi) :=
∂uˆ (b, zi)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, zi)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.20)
This is an elasticity of material utility to benefit level. The result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
, (2.21)
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
, (2.22)
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
. (2.23)
Proof. Equilibrium equations in this model are as follows:


p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
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By logarithmic transformation, we obtain the following:


ln p = ln uˆ (b, z1)− ln s (pi, z1)− lnφ,
ln q = ln uˆ (b, z2)− ln s (pi, z2)− lnφ,
ln pi = ln p− ln q.
(2.24)
Totally differentiating (2.24) and setting dθ = dw = dφ = dz1 = dz2 = dγ = 0 yield the
following:


dp
p
=
∂uˆ (b, z1) /∂b
uˆ (b, z1)
db−
∂s (pi, z1) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
dpi,
dq
q
=
∂uˆ (b, z2) /∂b
uˆ (b, z2)
db−
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z2)
dpi,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
(2.25)
By deforming (2.25) and using two types of elasticities of (2.17) and (2.20), we get the
following matrix:


1 0 −εpi (z1)
0 1 −εpi (z2)
1 −1 −1




dp/p
db/b
dq/q
db/b
dpi/pi
db/b


=


ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
0

 . (2.26)
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By Cramer’s rule, solutions of (2.26) are given as follows:


dp/p
db/b
=
− ηb (z1) [1 + εpi (z2)] + ηb (z2) εpi (z1)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dq/q
db/b
=
ηb (z2) [1 + εpi (z1)]− ηb (z1) εpi (z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dpi/pi
db/b
=
− ηb(z1) + ηb(z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
.
(2.27)
The denominator in (2.27), εpi(z1) − [1 + εpi(z2)], is negative because εpi∗ (z1) − εpi∗ (z2) is
less than 1 from the stability condition (2.19). Therefore, the result of comparative statics
regarding a change in benefit level is given as follows:
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
.
Proposition 1 indicates that when the ratio of (2.20) between types, ηb(z1)/ηb(z2), is
sufficiently low, the equilibrium proportion of recipients of the needy type, p∗, the equilibrium
proportion of recipients of the non-needy type, q∗, and their ratio, pi∗ = p∗/q∗, decrease
according to the level of welfare benefit. The implication of Proposition 1 is the following. If
the non-needy type’s elasticity of material utility to benefit level is sufficiently higher than
the needy type’s, then the impact of increasing recipients of the non-needy type to stigma,
which is the direct effect of an increase in benefit level, is stronger than that of the needy type,
and the level of stigma cost increases. If this increase in the stigma cost level is sufficiently
large, then the indirect effect, the disincentive effect to take up welfare from an increase in
stigma, outweighs the direct effect, the incentive effect to take up welfare from an increase
in the benefit level, resulting in fewer beneficiaries.
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We denote R as a proportion of recipients to total population. Since the size of the
population is normalized to 1, R is given as follows:
R = γp+ (1− γ)q. (2.28)
An effect of a change in benefit level on R is the following:
dR∗
db
= γ
dp∗
db
+ (1− γ)
dq∗
db
. (2.29)
The sign of an effect of a change in benefit level on the recipient ratio is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 The sign of dR
∗
db
is given as follows:
sgn
dR∗
db
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1− γ + εpi∗ (z1)
γ + εpi∗ (z2)
]
. (2.30)
Proposition 2 reveals the possibility that the recipient ratio decreases as the benefit level
increases. The recipient ratio increases in the benefit level when the ratio of elasticity,
ηb(z1)/ηb(z2), is sufficiently low, and vice versa. The mechanism of Proposition 2 is similar
to that of Proposition 1 since the effect of a change in benefit level on the recipient ratio is
the total effect of adding the effect on the needy type and the effect on the non-needy type.
In this section, we construct a theoretical model that can account for welfare fraud and
non-take-up simultaneously; the welfare stigma cost varies with the quality of the recipient,
and the decision-making of potential recipients depends on the expectation of the level of
stigma cost; the stigma cost is assumed to increase with respect to the conditional probability
that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient. This stems from the idea that, in this world, it
is not condemnable for a truly needy person to take up welfare, but a negative image is
formed about a non-needy person who take up welfare, which becomes a source of stigma. In
equilibrium, welfare fraud and non-take-up occur simultaneously. In the comparative static
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analysis, we show that an increase in the level of benefits can result in a decrease in the
recipient ratio for the needy type and the recipient ratio for the non-needy type. Thus, the
recipient ratio of the economy as a whole could also be lower with respect to the level of
benefits. In the next section, we empirically test the results of this theoretical analysis using
OECD panel data.
3 Empirical analysis
This section presents empirical evidence to verify the analysis in Section 2 by exploring the
relationship between the recipient ratio and the minimum income benefit level using the
OECD panel data.
3.1 Econometric model
The panel data were analyzed to investigate the correlation between the minimum guaran-
teed income level and social benefit recipients. The decision to employ the panel data to
investigate the relationship reflects three motivations. First, a panel data model can have
better prediction accuracy than the cross-sectional model and time-series model because it
includes more observations than cross-section data and time-series data. Second, it enables
researchers to address the issue of endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias. Third, it
allows us to include changes in society in the empirical analysis (Greene, 2012). This pa-
per analyzes the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and social benefit
recipient ratio based on the baseline model:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit, (3.1)
where yit is the dependent variable, x
′
it is the K-dimensional vector of predictors consisting of
the target explanatory variable and the covariates, β is the K-dimensional vector of unknown
parameters, and eit is the disturbance term, which is distributed as eit ∼ N (0, σ
2
e). Further-
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more, in Equation (3.1), i = 1, . . . n indicates the index for a country, whereas t = 1, . . . , T
represents the index for time. The OLS estimation of Equation (3.1) after pooling the avail-
able data is called the pooling estimation.
When we consider the country-specific heterogeneity in the disturbance term of Equation
(3.1), eit can be decomposed as follows:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + νit, (3.2)
where αi is the error depending on the country i and νit ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ
2
ν) is the stochastic dis-
turbance term. Equation (3.2) can be considered a one-way error component model (Baltagi,
1984) because it decomposes the disturbance term eit into the error based on the individual
heterogeneity and the stochastic error. The model in Equation (3.2) can be estimated us-
ing a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereafter referred to as one-way FE) and the one-way
random-effect estimator (hereafter refered to as one-way RE). The one-way FE presumes the
binary dummy variable for αi, whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual effect is
randomly determined.
Considering the heterogeneity caused by the individual effect as in Equation (3.1), the
disturbance term can be further decomposed to incorporate heterogeneity in time:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + λt + νit, (3.3)
where λt is the error depending on the time t. Equation (3.3), a two-way error component
model (Baltagi, 1984), decomposes the disturbance term into the error based on the hetero-
geneity of country i, the error caused by the time, such as economic during shocks, and the
stochastic disturbance. As with Equation (3.2),the model of Equation (3.3) can be estimated
by a two-way fixed-effect estimator (hereafter referred to as two-way FE) and a two-way
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random-effect estimator (hereafter referred to as two-way RE).
This paper estimates the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and
social benefit recipients using five estimation methods: pooling, one-way FE, one-way RE,
two-way FE, and two-way RE. These estimation methods are assessed via hypothesis testing.
We first implement the F -test for pooling versus one-way FE or two-way FE. Second, we
perform the Lagrange multiplier test (hereafter, the LM -test) (Honda, 1985) for pooling
versus one-way RE or two-way RE. Finally, we conduct a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978)
for one-way RE versus one-way FE, two-way RE, and two-way FE. Further information on
hypothesis testing in the panel data analysis has been provided by Baltagi (2008).
3.2 Data
This section proposes the details of our dataset used for estimation of the panel data models
introduced in Section 3.1. All of the data described below were obtained from OECD.Stat
(OECD, 2019).
For the dependent variable, we use the logit-transformed version (logit recipient ratio)
of the recipient ratio (recipient ratio), which is the ratio of social benefit recipients to the
total population. Data on the number of social benefit recipients were retrieved from the
Social Benefit Recipients Database, and total population data were obtained from Population
Statistics.
For the target explanatory variable, we include the minimum guaranteed income mgincome,
which represents the degree of social benefits in terms of the ratio of the per capita social
benefits to the median per capita income. These data can be retrieved from the Adequacy
of Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits. Furthermore, we incorporate the quadratic term
mgincome (mgincome 2) to consider the nonlinear effect of the target explanatory variable.
In order to account for any estimation biases caused by unobserved confounders, we
additionally incorporate the following covariates into the vector of predictors:
• log gdp capita: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (gdp capita), retrieved from
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Annual National Accounts. GDP per capita, which reflects the economic situation in
each country, is likely to have an immediate impact on the recipient ratio, but there
is a relatively delayed impact on mgincome.
• youth dependency: ratio of young population (0 to 14 years old) to productive popu-
lation (15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. This reflects the demographic
burden of each country (the ratio of the unproductive population to the productive
population). The proportion of younger unproductive population is expected to affect
the recipient ratio; it is unlikely to affect mgincome.
• old dependency: ratio of old population (over 65 years old) to productive population
(15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. The proportion of older unproductive
population is expected to affect the recipient ratio; it is unlikely to affect mgincome.
• divorce rate: the divorce rate, retrieved from the Family Database. It is a proxy
of the household structure, which has an impact on the recipient ratio throughout
time. The tighter the time constraints are, the lower the income.
• unemployment: the national unemployment rate for the working-age population, re-
trieved from Labor Force Statistics. It is similar to log gdp capita, which reflects the
economic situation in each country.
• population growth: the population growth, retrieved from Population Statistics and
calculated by the authors. This could be a confounding factor that positively affects
both recipient ratio and mgincome. This is because recipient ratio is calculated
as the ratio of recipients to the population, while mgincome is likely to be affected by
population growth through economic growth (Brueckner and Schwandt, 2015).
The panel dataset includes a date for the aforementioned variables. After reducing some
missing series in the sample that were not randomly missing, we obtain panel data for n = 25
countries covering the time frame from 2007 to 2012. This paper conducts the empirical
analysis using the panel data with the number of observations nT = N = 150.
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Let us simply examine the differences in mgincome by country and year. mgincome, one of
the levels of social welfare, represents the share of social welfare benefits in median disposable
income. In order to examine each of those factors that determine mgincome, the relationship
between the median disposable income and the amount of benefits is shown as Figure 1. The
median income for each year in each country was obtained from the Income Distribution
Database of OECD.stat, and the social welfare benefits were calculated using the median
disposable income as described above. Units for both median social welfare benefits and
income are converted to US dollars for each year. The solid line is a simple regression of
these data. The scatterplot with the addition of this regression curve simply appears to show
a positive linear relationship of benefits to the median income. Here, this study confirms
institutional changes in those social welfare policies over the period of the samples using
OECD country policy descriptions (OECD, 2020) for those countries (Denmark, Spain, and
Iceland) that have country-year observations with residuals defined by this regression curve
above the 95th percentile in the sample. First, there was a social welfare policy change in
Denmark regarding the requirements for taking-up welfare in 2008, when the obligation for
family members was relaxed to allow spouses who could not work to take up welfare benefits
as long as they had performed 300 hours of regular work within the previous two years. In
Spain and Iceland, no institutional changes in social welfare could be identified within the
sample period. Institutional changes such as those that have taken place in Denmark could
occur in other countries as well. This country-dependent heterogeneity of these institutional
changes is explained by the error-component model described in Section 3.1.
3.3 Result
This section presents the result of the empirical analysis investigating the relationship be-
tween the minimum guaranteed income level and the ratio of the number of recipients.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of pooled panel data. This table demonstrates
the large inequality between the minimum and maximum recipient ratio (minimum: 0.001,
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maximum: 0.037). Furthermore, the maximum of mgincome in Table 1 indicates that coun-
tries tend to guarantee almost 60% of the median per capita income through social benefit
programs, although the median and mean of the guaranteed minimum income is approxi-
mately 40%.
Examining the descriptive statistics by country, Tables 2 and 3 indicate the necessity of
adjustment by covariates or dealing with country-based heterogeneity when we assume that
the minimum income benefit level is the determinant factor influencing benefit recipients/
total population ratio. For example, Canada and the Slovak Republic have the same maxi-
mum mean of recipient ratio (0.034); however, their mean minimum guaranteed income levels
differ (Canada: 0.368, Slovak Republic: 0.238).
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics by year. Although no large difference in means
and medians can be found in this table, the standard deviation of the minimum guaranteed
income level includes a relatively large outlier in 2012 (0.89). This motivates us to include
time-specific heterogeneity in our model by estimating the two-way error component model.
Before proceeding to regression analysis, let us discuss the simple correlation between
benefit level and recipient ratio. Figure 2 presents the scatterplot of the observed couples
(mgincome, recipient ratio). Even though the figure depicts the roughly convex relation-
ship of two variables of interest, possible confounders might lead to a spurious correlation
among them. We thus discuss a regression analysis taking into account other factors, which
may affect both of these target variables, and unobserved heterogeneity pertaining to country-
specific factors and time-specific factors.
As the main findings in this empirical evidence, Table 5 shows the estimation results of
panel data regression models based on the data introduced in Section 3.2. Each row corre-
sponds to an explanatory variable, and each column corresponds to an estimation method.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are estimated using the heteroscedastic-
ity and autocorrelation consistent estimator (hereafter referred to as the HAC estimator) of
Arellano (1987). The bottom part of this table provides the results of the hypothesis testing
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carried out for model evaluation.
Regarding the hypothesis testing concerning the pooling estimation, both one-way FE and
two-way FE are accepted at 1% statistical significance according to the F -test results. LM -
tests for the random-effect estimators reject the pooling estimation at 1% significance but
accept the one-way RE and two-way RE at the same level of significance. In the comparison
of fixed-effect estimators and random-effect estimators, Hausman tests do not reject either
one-way RE or two-way RE. Furthermore, neither of the fixed-effect estimators are accepted.
Examining the estimated coefficients by pooling estimation, mgincome has a significantly
positive effect on the recipient ratio, and its quadratic term has a significantly negative effect
on the recipient ratio. This suggests that the minimum guaranteed income level has an
upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio. However, the results of the F -test, which
compares the pooling estimation with the fixed-effect estimators, and of the LM -test, which
compares the pooling estimation with the random-effect estimators, highlight the necessity
to account for heterogeneity in a country or in both a country and with time.
The Hausman test results in Table 5 suggest that the correlation between the explanatory
variables and country effect or between the explanatory variables and both country effect and
time effect is not statistically significant, i.e., the correlation between xit and αi or xit and
both αi and λt is not statistically significant. Therefore, the random-effect estimator, which
assumes no correlation between the explanatory variables and decomposed effects such as
αi and λt, is the most preferable method according to the hypothesis test results. In the
estimation result of one-way RE considering country-specific heterogeneity, the minimum
guaranteed income level has an upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio as well as
the pooling estimation. This relationship is similar to the one found in the estimation of the
two-way error component models.
Figure 3 presents the fitted curve of one-way RE with the scatter plot of the couples of
observations (mgincome, logit recipient ratio). As we discussed, the one-way RE curve
indeed visually indicates the upper convex relationship between the benefit level and the
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recipient ratio.
The relationship between the level of social welfare and the recipient ratio shown by this
empirical analysis, given the background of the theoretical analysis, is that according to
Proposition 2, an increase in the level of benefits has both direct and indirect effects. The
direct effect is that an increase in the level of benefits raises the material utility of taking-up
welfare and increases the incentive of taking-up it. On the other hand, the indirect effect
shows a negative sign when the rate of increase in non-needy type recipients is greater than
the rate of increase in needy type recipients when the benefit level increases, which produces a
disincentive effect of taking-up welfare. When the indirect effect is negative and its magnitude
is large, the effect dominates the direct effect and the total effect is thus negative. Combining
the inverse U-shaped relationship and the theoretical mechanism of the empirical analysis
of mgincome and logit recipient ratio, it can be said that when the benefit level is low,
the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, or the indirect effect is also positive. On the
other hand, when the benefit level is somewhat higher, the indirect effect is negative, which
further dominates the direct effect and the recipient ratio thus decreases.
Figure 4 includes two categories of members defined by an estimated maximum value of
recipient ratio. Each member is shown in Tables 6 and 7. ‘group 1’, whose members have less
mgincome than the threshold, and a benefit level corresponding to an estimated maximum of
logit recipient ratio by one-way RE, includes Austria, Canada and Spain. On the other
hand, ‘group 2’, whose members have more mgincome than the benefit level corresponding
to an estimated maximum of logit recipient ratio, includes Netherlands, Denmark and
Germany.
For example, Figure 4 shows that Spain, a ‘group 1’ country, had a low level of social
welfare benefits and a low recipient ratio for the period from 2007 to 2012. Moreover, the
recipient ratio is the highest for countries with high benefit levels, such as France, for the
period from 2007 to 2012. Therefore, it can be determined that there is a positive relationship
between the benefit level and the recipient ratio in ‘group 1’. On the other hand, the recipient
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ratio has started to decrease in the situation where the benefit level increased from 2007 to
2012 in Switzerland and Australia, which are ‘group 2’ countries that are above the threshold
of mgincome defined in our estimated maximum recipient ratio by one-way RE. In addition, if
we consider the countries with higher benefit levels than those in Switzerland and Australia,
we can observe that Germany has a higher benefit level and a much lower recipient ratio
from 2007 to 2012. Therefore, it can be determined that the benefit level and recipient ratio
are negatively related in ‘group 2’.
To confirm the robustness of the estimated results obtained so far, we perform a sensitivity
analysis by excluding covariates. Table 8 displays the results of the one-way RE estimation
by adding the covariates one by one. The reason for choosing one-way RE as the estimator
here is that it is the most statistically significant, as a result of the hypothesis testing for
each estimator using the full model described above. As this Table shows, the coefficient
of mgincome is positive in all cases where covariates are lacking, and the squared term of
mgincome exhibits a significantly negative coefficient. All of the estimation results in Table
8 show a relationship that is consistent with the results that have been estimated by the full
model. The sensitivity analysis therefore strengthens the robust inverse U-shaped relationship
between the level of social welfare benefits and the recipient ratio which has been estimated
so far.
In this section, an empirical analysis is conducted to verify the results of the theoretical
analysis in the previous section using OECD panel data for the period from 2007 to 2012.
The results of this empirical analysis show that the relationship between the benefit level and
the recipient ratio in a given country is exhibited by an inverse U-shape, and the robustness
of this result is further confirmed by a sensitivity analysis. The results of these empirical
analyses reinforce the counterintuitive theoretical consequence that, under ceteris-paribus, an
increase in benefit levels leads to a decrease in the recipient ratio.
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4 Conclusion
This study contributed with the respect to the following points: first, we constructed the
model in which non-take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and showed that a
comparative static analysis reveals the possibility that the recipient ratio decreases as the
benefit level increases. Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find
that this association is observed and that the benefit level and the recipient ratio exhibit an
inverse U-shaped relationship. The results of this empirical analysis supported the counter-
intuitive theoretical result that an increase in the benefit level leads to a lower the recipient
ratio when other conditions are held constant.
In this paper, we consider only the discrete decision of whether or not to participate in the
labor market. Labor supply decisions after labor market participation are continuous, and
both intensive and extensive margin are important in considering welfare benefit programs.
Saez (2002) analyzes optimal income transfers in light of both of them. Future work intro-
duces an endogenous stigma into the framework of Saez (2002) to analyze a more realistic
model and present practical policy implications.
Although this paper and Besley and Coate (1992) analyze static models of welfare stigma,
we present the following questions. How do welfare stigma and behavior of potential recipi-
ents change in long-term? How do the dynamics of welfare stigma and potential recipients’
behavior change during the process of adjustment to equilibrium? Itaya and Kurita (2020)
attempts to investigate such questions using the replicator dynamics.
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Figure 1: Relationship between the median income and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate the attribute of observation, which combines
the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries shown in the table below with the last 2 digits of
the observation year. All numerical units are converted to US dollars for the corresponding
year.
country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation
Australia AU Finland FI Luxembourg LU Slovenia SI
Austria AT France FR Netherlands NL Spain ES
Belgium BE Germany DE New Zealand NZ Sweden SE
Canada CA Hungary HU Norway NO Switzerland CH
Czech Republic CZ Iceland IS Poland PL
Denmark DK Israel IL Portugal PT
Estonia EE Korea KR Slovak Republic SK
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Figure 2: Simple relationship between the recipient ratio and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate the attribute of observation, which combines
the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries shown in the table below with the last 2 digits of
the observation year.
country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation
Australia AU Finland FI Luxembourg LU Slovenia SI
Austria AT France FR Netherlands NL Spain ES
Belgium BE Germany DE New Zealand NZ Sweden SE
Canada CA Hungary HU Norway NO Switzerland CH
Czech Republic CZ Iceland IS Poland PL
Denmark DK Israel IL Portugal PT
Estonia EE Korea KR Slovak Republic SK
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Figure 3: Fitted curve of one-way RE and scatterplot between the recipient ratio and benefit
level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate the attribute of observation, which combines
the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries shown in the table below with the last 2 digits of
the observation year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of mgincome which
corresponds to an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit obtained by the fitted
curve of one-way RE. ‘group 1’ and ‘group 2’ are defined by the location based on the
dashed blue line. If an observed value of mgincome is less than the dashed blue line, it is
categorized as ‘group 1’; otherwise, it is categorized as ‘group 2’.
country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation
Australia AU Finland FI Luxembourg LU Slovenia SI
Austria AT France FR Netherlands NL Spain ES
Belgium BE Germany DE New Zealand NZ Sweden SE
Canada CA Hungary HU Norway NO Switzerland CH
Czech Republic CZ Iceland IS Poland PL
Denmark DK Israel IL Portugal PT
Estonia EE Korea KR Slovak Republic SK
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Figure 4: Scatterplot between the recipient ratio and benefit level, grouped
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate the attribute of observation, which combines
the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries shown in the table below with the last 2 digits of
the observation year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of mgincome which
corresponds to an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit obtained by the fitted
curve of one-way RE. ‘group 1’ and ‘group 2’ are defined by the location based on the
dashed blue line. If an observed value of mgincome is less than the dashed blue line, it is
categorized as ‘group 1’; otherwise, it is categorized as ‘group 2’.
country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation country abbreviation
Australia AU Finland FI Luxembourg LU Slovenia SI
Austria AT France FR Netherlands NL Spain ES
Belgium BE Germany DE New Zealand NZ Sweden SE
Canada CA Hungary HU Norway NO Switzerland CH
Czech Republic CZ Iceland IS Poland PL
Denmark DK Israel IL Portugal PT
Estonia EE Korea KR Slovak Republic SK
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: whole data
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max
recipient ratio 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.001 0.037
logit recipient ratio -4.327 -4.175 0.753 -6.591 -3.268
mgincome 0.397 0.400 0.082 0.230 0.590
mgincome 2 0.164 0.160 0.065 0.053 0.348
gdp capita 37704.939 37699.559 14081.170 16788.433 91814.013
log gdp capita 10.479 10.537 0.335 9.728 11.428
youth dependency 0.254 0.241 0.053 0.199 0.459
old dependency 0.229 0.238 0.040 0.138 0.314
divorce rate 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003
unemployment 0.074 0.072 0.037 0.023 0.249
population growth 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.025
Notes : T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: by country (1)
country recipient ratio logit recipient ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Australia 0.013 (0.001) -4.315 (0.074) 0.447 (0.010) 0.200 (0.009) 40852.112 (2156.481) 10.617 (0.053)
Austria 0.018 (0.002) -4.029 (0.138) 0.430 (0.039) 0.186 (0.035) 42435.028 (2584.710) 10.654 (0.060)
Belgium 0.009 (0.000) -4.744 (0.035) 0.437 (0.012) 0.191 (0.011) 39517.464 (2220.265) 10.583 (0.056)
Canada 0.034 (0.002) -3.335 (0.049) 0.368 (0.017) 0.136 (0.013) 40428.026 (1271.527) 10.607 (0.031)
Czech Republic 0.013 (0.006) -4.592 (0.996) 0.315 (0.032) 0.100 (0.022) 27776.316 (1070.706) 10.231 (0.039)
Denmark 0.015 (0.002) -4.161 (0.140) 0.575 (0.010) 0.331 (0.012) 42137.252 (2322.734) 10.647 (0.055)
Estonia 0.007 (0.003) -4.984 (0.433) 0.273 (0.033) 0.076 (0.018) 22846.807 (2032.578) 10.033 (0.088)
Finland 0.021 (0.001) -3.837 (0.056) 0.462 (0.010) 0.213 (0.009) 39257.144 (1350.605) 10.577 (0.034)
France 0.019 (0.002) -3.929 (0.094) 0.382 (0.004) 0.146 (0.003) 35822.205 (1475.914) 10.486 (0.041)
Germany 0.004 (0.000) -5.525 (0.044) 0.515 (0.008) 0.265 (0.009) 39925.940 (2678.832) 10.593 (0.066)
Hungary 0.023 (0.003) -3.747 (0.142) 0.365 (0.059) 0.136 (0.044) 21298.496 (1512.043) 9.964 (0.072)
Iceland 0.009 (0.001) -4.710 (0.076) 0.405 (0.038) 0.165 (0.031) 41380.192 (1215.725) 10.630 (0.029)
Israel 0.011 (0.001) -4.547 (0.090) 0.457 (0.008) 0.209 (0.007) 28872.669 (1899.220) 10.269 (0.065)
Korea 0.031 (0.002) -3.456 (0.055) 0.353 (0.014) 0.125 (0.010) 29748.950 (1733.041) 10.299 (0.058)
Luxembourg 0.017 (0.001) -4.050 (0.077) 0.428 (0.020) 0.184 (0.017) 86918.694 (3971.080) 11.372 (0.045)
Netherlands 0.020 (0.001) -3.902 (0.076) 0.510 (0.015) 0.260 (0.015) 45641.618 (1321.341) 10.728 (0.029)
New Zealand 0.002 (0.000) -6.368 (0.100) 0.418 (0.004) 0.175 (0.003) 30845.995 (1511.117) 10.336 (0.049)
Norway 0.010 (0.001) -4.610 (0.054) 0.400 (0.006) 0.160 (0.005) 59776.358 (3956.631) 10.997 (0.066)
Poland 0.012 (0.001) -4.378 (0.081) 0.325 (0.036) 0.107 (0.025) 20207.247 (2579.601) 9.907 (0.129)
Portugal 0.012 (0.002) -4.419 (0.128) 0.332 (0.026) 0.111 (0.017) 26558.193 (521.970 ) 10.187 (0.020)
Slovak Republic 0.034 (0.002) -3.360 (0.076) 0.238 (0.008) 0.057 (0.004) 24142.536 (2038.476) 10.089 (0.086)
Slovenia 0.022 (0.002) -3.818 (0.092) 0.418 (0.008) 0.175 (0.006) 28351.080 (880.111 ) 10.252 (0.031)
Spain 0.004 (0.001) -5.658 (0.320) 0.248 (0.013) 0.062 (0.007) 32403.199 (568.189 ) 10.386 (0.017)
Sweden 0.024 (0.001) -3.686 (0.055) 0.387 (0.010) 0.150 (0.008) 42080.770 (1911.048) 10.646 (0.045)
Switzerland 0.018 (0.001) -4.013 (0.055) 0.433 (0.015) 0.188 (0.013) 53399.177 (3100.762) 10.884 (0.058)
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150Numbers in parentheses represent the standard deviation.
32
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: by country (2)
country youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment population growth
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Australia 0.284 (0.002) 0.201 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.050 (0.005) 0.017 (0.003)
Austria 0.222 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.004) 0.003 (0.001)
Belgium 0.257 (0.001) 0.261 (0.003) 0.003 (0.000) 0.076 (0.005) 0.009 (0.002)
Canada 0.239 (0.004) 0.203 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.073 (0.010) 0.011 (0.001)
Czech Republic 0.205 (0.006) 0.218 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.063 (0.011) 0.004 (0.004)
Denmark 0.276 (0.004) 0.251 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.061 (0.020) 0.005 (0.001)
Estonia 0.226 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.107 (0.048) -0.002 (0.001)
Finland 0.252 (0.002) 0.261 (0.014) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.008) 0.005 (0.000)
France 0.284 (0.003) 0.261 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.085 (0.009) 0.005 (0.000)
Germany 0.205 (0.002) 0.310 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.071 (0.012) -0.004 (0.003)
Hungary 0.215 (0.003) 0.241 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.098 (0.017) -0.003 (0.001)
Iceland 0.311 (0.003) 0.179 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.056 (0.024) 0.008 (0.013)
Israel 0.454 (0.005) 0.160 (0.004) 0.002 (0.000) 0.083 (0.011) 0.019 (0.002)
Korea 0.227 (0.016) 0.149 (0.009) 0.002 (0.000) 0.035 (0.002) 0.006 (0.001)
Luxembourg 0.259 (0.008) 0.204 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.005) 0.019 (0.003)
Netherlands 0.263 (0.003) 0.230 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.041 (0.008) 0.004 (0.001)
New Zealand 0.316 (0.001) 0.195 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.058 (0.014) 0.009 (0.002)
Norway 0.285 (0.004) 0.226 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.031 (0.004) 0.012 (0.001)
Poland 0.215 (0.003) 0.191 (0.003) 0.002 (0.000) 0.092 (0.012) 0.002 (0.004)
Portugal 0.230 (0.004) 0.277 (0.010) 0.002 (0.000) 0.113 (0.032) -0.000 (0.002)
Slovak Republic 0.217 (0.004) 0.173 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.125 (0.019) 0.001 (0.000)
Slovenia 0.203 (0.004) 0.238 (0.006) 0.001 (0.000) 0.067 (0.018) 0.004 (0.003)
Spain 0.218 (0.005) 0.247 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.173 (0.063) 0.009 (0.007)
Sweden 0.257 (0.003) 0.279 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.011) 0.008 (0.001)
Switzerland 0.220 (0.007) 0.252 (0.011) 0.002 (0.000) 0.042 (0.006) 0.009 (0.005)
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150Numbers in parentheses represent the standard deviation.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: by year
year recipient ratio logit recipient ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment population growth
Mean
2007 0.016 -4.339 0.396 0.164 35645.300 10.419 0.257 0.221 0.002 0.060 0.007
2008 0.015 -4.383 0.391 0.160 37381.672 10.468 0.255 0.223 0.002 0.057 0.008
2009 0.016 -4.311 0.397 0.164 36290.570 10.443 0.253 0.226 0.002 0.078 0.007
2010 0.017 -4.275 0.400 0.166 37469.973 10.476 0.252 0.230 0.002 0.084 0.006
2011 0.016 -4.370 0.399 0.166 39355.518 10.524 0.252 0.234 0.002 0.081 0.005
2012 0.016 -4.284 0.398 0.166 40086.599 10.543 0.252 0.240 0.002 0.083 0.005
Median
2007 0.016 -4.147 0.400 0.160 36871.534 10.515 0.249 0.229 0.002 0.054 0.005
2008 0.014 -4.231 0.400 0.160 38133.413 10.549 0.242 0.234 0.002 0.056 0.007
2009 0.015 -4.212 0.400 0.160 37695.802 10.537 0.240 0.237 0.002 0.078 0.005
2010 0.015 -4.156 0.400 0.160 38737.069 10.565 0.237 0.239 0.002 0.077 0.005
2011 0.015 -4.194 0.420 0.176 40683.337 10.614 0.236 0.240 0.002 0.072 0.004
2012 0.016 -4.127 0.420 0.176 40619.937 10.612 0.236 0.248 0.002 0.074 0.004
Standard Deviation
2007 0.009 0.775 0.082 0.064 13813.492 0.353 0.054 0.039 0.000 0.024 0.007
2008 0.008 0.758 0.084 0.064 14436.887 0.348 0.054 0.040 0.000 0.022 0.007
2009 0.009 0.731 0.082 0.065 13382.286 0.336 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.033 0.007
2010 0.009 0.728 0.080 0.065 13804.461 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040 0.006
2011 0.010 0.865 0.084 0.068 14869.727 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040 0.007
2012 0.009 0.726 0.089 0.071 15019.149 0.329 0.054 0.042 0.000 0.046 0.007
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data
Dependent variable:
logit recipient ratio
Pooling one-way FE two-way FE one-way RE two-way RE
mgincome 15.434∗∗ 18.021∗∗∗ 19.430∗∗∗ 17.534∗∗∗ 19.006∗∗∗
(6.382) (6.737) (7.076) (6.704) (6.843)
mgincome 2 −16.573∗∗ −21.915∗∗∗ −23.710∗∗∗ −21.050∗∗ −22.761∗∗∗
(7.593) (7.800) (8.399) (8.198) (8.512)
log gdp capita 0.252 0.492 0.332 0.423 0.352
(0.264) (0.394) (0.570) (0.261) (0.295)
unemployment 2.736 5.417∗∗∗ 5.842∗∗∗ 5.250∗∗∗ 5.602∗∗∗
(2.387) (1.654) (2.019) (1.375) (1.775)
youth dependency −6.370∗∗∗ −4.024 −5.626 −5.208 −6.160
(1.624) (7.033) (7.782) (3.685) (4.189)
old dependency −8.012∗∗∗ −4.283 −8.213 −5.069 −7.638
(2.192) (5.286) (8.324) (3.977) (5.348)
divorce rate 81.888 244.345 281.102 204.770 255.144
(172.752) (210.052) (216.581) (186.280) (191.322)
population growth −4.079 12.090∗ 12.621∗ 10.512 11.681
(13.483) (7.213) (7.048) (8.717) (8.643)
Constant −7.279∗∗ −10.693∗∗∗ −9.555∗∗∗
(2.932) (3.323) (3.354)
R2 0.163 0.233 0.246 0.214 0.251
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.023 −0.003 0.170 0.179
F -test (vs. pooling) 57.200 ∗∗∗ 47.991∗∗∗
F -test (vs. one-way FE) 1.219
LM -test (vs. pooling) 17.294∗∗∗ 11.119∗∗∗
Hausman-test (vs. random effect) 1.424 0.950
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano,
1987) estimator. Above ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: ‘group 1’ countries less than an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit by
one-way RE
group 1
country year name year country year name year
Austria 2008 AT08 Luxembourg 2007 LU07
Austria 2009 AT09 New Zealand 2008 NZ08
Austria 2010 AT10 Norway 2007 NO07
Canada 2007 CA07 Norway 2008 NO08
Canada 2008 CA08 Norway 2009 NO09
Canada 2009 CA09 Norway 2010 NO10
Canada 2010 CA10 Norway 2011 NO11
Canada 2011 CA11 Norway 2012 NO12
Canada 2012 CA12 Poland 2007 PL07
Czech Republic 2007 CZ07 Poland 2008 PL08
Czech Republic 2008 CZ08 Poland 2009 PL09
Czech Republic 2009 CZ09 Poland 2010 PL10
Czech Republic 2010 CZ10 Poland 2011 PL11
Czech Republic 2011 CZ11 Poland 2012 PL12
Czech Republic 2012 CZ12 Portugal 2007 PT07
Estonia 2007 EE07 Portugal 2008 PT08
Estonia 2008 EE08 Portugal 2009 PT09
Estonia 2009 EE09 Portugal 2010 PT10
Estonia 2010 EE10 Portugal 2011 PT11
Estonia 2011 EE11 Portugal 2012 PT12
Estonia 2012 EE12 Slovak Republic 2007 SK07
France 2007 FR07 Slovak Republic 2008 SK08
France 2008 FR08 Slovak Republic 2009 SK09
France 2009 FR09 Slovak Republic 2010 SK10
France 2010 FR10 Slovak Republic 2011 SK11
France 2011 FR11 Slovak Republic 2012 SK12
France 2012 FR12 Slovenia 2007 SI07
Hungary 2009 HU09 Slovenia 2008 SI08
Hungary 2010 HU10 Spain 2007 ES07
Hungary 2011 HU11 Spain 2008 ES08
Hungary 2012 HU12 Spain 2009 ES09
Iceland 2007 IS07 Spain 2010 ES10
Iceland 2008 IS08 Spain 2011 ES11
Iceland 2009 IS09 Spain 2012 ES12
Korea 2007 KR07 Sweden 2007 SE07
Korea 2008 KR08 Sweden 2008 SE08
Korea 2009 KR09 Sweden 2009 SE09
Korea 2010 KR10 Sweden 2010 SE10
Korea 2011 KR11 Sweden 2011 SE11
Korea 2012 KR12 Sweden 2012 SE12
Notes: ‘group 1’ defined by countries with the value of recipient ratio logit which is
less than an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit by one-way RE. Column
‘name year’ indicates ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the
year.
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Table 7: ‘group 2’ countries less than an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit by
one-way RE
group 2
country year name year country year name year
Australia 2007 AU07 Israel 2009 IL09
Australia 2008 AU08 Israel 2010 IL10
Australia 2009 AU09 Israel 2011 IL11
Australia 2010 AU10 Israel 2012 IL12
Australia 2011 AU11 Luxembourg 2008 LU08
Australia 2012 AU12 Luxembourg 2009 LU09
Austria 2007 AT07 Luxembourg 2010 LU10
Austria 2011 AT11 Luxembourg 2011 LU11
Austria 2012 AT12 Luxembourg 2012 LU12
Belgium 2007 BE07 Netherlands 2007 NL07
Belgium 2008 BE08 Netherlands 2008 NL08
Belgium 2009 BE09 Netherlands 2009 NL09
Belgium 2010 BE10 Netherlands 2010 NL10
Belgium 2011 BE11 Netherlands 2011 NL11
Belgium 2012 BE12 Netherlands 2012 NL12
Denmark 2007 DK07 New Zealand 2007 NZ07
Denmark 2008 DK08 New Zealand 2009 NZ09
Denmark 2009 DK09 New Zealand 2010 NZ10
Denmark 2010 DK10 New Zealand 2011 NZ11
Denmark 2011 DK11 New Zealand 2012 NZ12
Denmark 2012 DK12 Slovenia 2009 SI09
Finland 2007 FI07 Slovenia 2010 SI10
Finland 2008 FI08 Slovenia 2011 SI11
Finland 2009 FI09 Slovenia 2012 SI12
Finland 2010 FI10 Switzerland 2007 CH07
Finland 2011 FI11 Switzerland 2008 CH08
Finland 2012 FI12 Switzerland 2009 CH09
Germany 2007 DE07 Switzerland 2010 CH10
Germany 2008 DE08 Switzerland 2011 CH11
Germany 2009 DE09 Switzerland 2012 CH12
Germany 2010 DE10
Germany 2011 DE11
Germany 2012 DE12
Hungary 2007 HU07
Hungary 2008 HU08
Iceland 2010 IS10
Iceland 2011 IS11
Iceland 2012 IS12
Israel 2007 IL07
Israel 2008 IL08
Notes: ‘group 2’ defined by countries with the value of recipient ratio logit which is
more than an estimated maximum of recipient ratio logit by one-way RE. Column
‘name year’ indicates ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the
year.
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Table 8: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data: Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable:
logit recipient ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mgincome 18.939∗∗ 19.186∗∗ 16.213∗∗ 18.320∗∗ 16.694∗∗ 17.301∗∗
(9.435) (9.375) (7.005) (7.447) (7.068) (7.034)
mgincome 2 −23.707∗∗ −24.034∗∗ −20.404∗∗ −22.777∗∗ −20.186∗∗ −20.831∗∗
(11.871) (11.807) (8.935) (9.430) (9.048) (8.722)
log gdp capita 0.084 0.067 0.033 0.367∗ 0.518∗
(0.272) (0.275) (0.300) (0.214) (0.278)
unemployment 2.942∗∗∗ 2.879∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗ 4.730∗∗∗
(0.733) (0.768) (0.740) (1.086)
youth dependency −3.903 −5.660 −5.629
(3.077) (3.985) (3.953)
old dependency −6.206 −6.518
(4.810) (4.823)
divorce rate 206.935
(187.571)
population growth
Constant −7.950∗∗∗ −8.873∗∗ −8.333∗∗ −7.431∗ −8.931∗∗∗ −11.083∗∗∗
(1.877) (3.586) (3.439) (3.869) (3.016) (3.277)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.081 0.082 0.138 0.153 0.184 0.196
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.064 0.114 0.124 0.150 0.156
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano,
1987) estimator. Above ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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